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The History of Mankind between Nature and Reason

In the course of a historic upheaval being described as a process of globalization, because all the nations and cultures are directly or indirectly conquered by the market, it does make sense to question those theorists of the modernity, who do not leave this process of expansion only to the technical sciences. Certainly Immanuel Kant was that Philosopher, who distinguished most strictly between instrumental or technical and moral reason being stuck to the unity of reason though like nobody else. He never left Königsberg, one of the gates to the world in those times, and did not need to travel to get aware of the necessity of world peace and to justify it through the law of reason. His daily company with students, merchants, soldiers, sailors and other travelers at table was enough for him to verify the strength and binding force of the reasonable argument. The standpoint of reason bound to the long term perspective of the moral progress of mankind in opposition to short sighted pragmatic purposes was tested first with friends, not with experts. That philosophical principles were discussed by educated citizens indirectly proves Kant's dictum of the unity of reason representing the conventional wisdom. Beyond the moral law reason and societal practice cannot evolve just power, which does not require any discourse or any participation of equal dialogue partners. At most rules of procedure are needed to control the access to power, so its elitist scale is conserved.

Kant, although in the real state of a subject and probably just feeling the coming Industrial Revolution was not familiar with the technocratic interpretation of modernity, because it did not cover the law of reason, which first of all comes out of logic and secondly has its residence in the common sense. So Kant dared to formulate the claim of reason for always and for all societies, no matter which status, race, religion, age, and more or less also which gender an individual does have and democratized the standpoint of reason which everybody could take up now, if he joined the discourse. Maybe the idea behind this basic attitude was rather the republican experiment in the New World than the French Revolution that Kant could justify only with a heavy heart, because its idea was reasonable but not the involved secret revolt, which did not cover the claim of a self-enlightening public. And maybe the travelers at his table did not only bring news from the world but also carried the discourse, the fight for the reasonable argument into the world establishing that fame that is only given to the "great philosophy" underlying – to say it with Feuerbach – "the matter of mankind".

In the global age it is quite interesting to discuss a "global philosopher", who never left his town. Not that Socrates would be known as a passionate traveler, but in the small ancient world Athens was more than a metropolis. Athens *was* the world, was the center of societal practice which reflected itself as a historic process. Outside of its walls there were only nature and barbarism or dependent trade and military camps. Compared with the self-appointed cosmopolitan Socrates, who did not have to travel to see the world, Kant's domesticity should not lead us astray to assume a certain naivety, which excellently grows in the province. Königsberg was not located at the periphery of 18th century Europe, as incorrect historiography presumes but stood as an important commercial capital in the center of current events. Kant's rootedness rather reminds of Leibniz' windowless monads that do not need any window to the outside world, because the process of true perception is given by the structure of logic. That's why monads are as blind as logic creating truth though as long as the deductive procedure does not turn into dogmatism as Kant warns in the introduction of the criticism of the pure reason. Dogmatic thinking is opposing the logic of sense through which Kant gets the conventional wisdom back into the boat.

The structure of the reasonable, the idea, shows the direction and proves itself in the strength of conviction to all the potential discourse partners, whose only quality is being able to judge. This ability as an anthropological condition of the biographical self-creation of man including the free will as an essential power a priori distinguishes rational acting not only from instinctive behavior. Beyond that powers of judgment guarantee equality and individuality of all human beings. If the destination of man is defined as the strength to evolve effectively all the abilities some time, then the message is a double one. First of all every human being is perfectible. Even the weakest does not follow a put down bond of destination but has to create it by developing one's abilities no matter how limited those abilities might be. Secondly nobody is provided with the same abilities, which explains the uniqueness of each single person as well as the indefinite ending of the history of mankind. This history is namely created by unique individuals and not by the "fact of reason". The fact of reason does not pass itself automatically forward in reasonable acting in opposite to Hegel's self-operating development of the absolute spirit, but realizes and manifest itself in societal practice only, if it has gone through the instance of the individual and has been recognized and acknowledged. The fact of reason explains the absolute obligation of the moral law, beyond of that man could not find his biographical destination. Would reasonable acting not mean moral acting at the same time, then we had also to acknowledge that kind of acting as suitable, which only takes advantage for oneself regardless of the disadvantages for the others. That such acting cannot really be effective or rational proves the view from the retrospective at the successful survival of the species, which has to compensate its lack of instincts by a specific sensitivity either called natural compassion (Rousseau), bashfulness (Kant) or in modern terms "emotional intelligence". Turned into a prospect the prediction can be made that the survival powers of the species will probably depend on the balance of instrumental and moral reason, in other words on the balance of short and long term perspectives. Moral reason first had to bundle up all the possible purposes and to control their tolerability with the categorical imperative, which only is obliged to itself respectively to the moral progress of societal practice. Secondly moral reason reflects the specific human sensitivity, which is –according to Rousseau – inherent in the free will and protecting it from itself by drawing a clear line to arbitrariness. And thirdly going back to a transcendental model of a pre-moral not amoral state of nature moral reason accentuates the future constitutional state as community of solidarity and not as the "order of the jungle", which coordinates the access to power by jungle law. It makes a difference whether the increasing network of regional markets and cultures submit to the moral law or not, whether the question is asked or not, in what way those are included in the usufruct of the made profit who work it out and not only given disproportionately to those who let work. Economic and social balance is desirable not only regarding the inner societal and international peace but also regarding the future perspective of the following generation. In future people will be more and more depend on acting in solidarity concerning a constantly growing world population and an increasing shortage of natural energy resources, if war, genocide and every kind of "social" or "biological engineering" is sorted out as an instrument of distribution. The difference between a pragmatic and moral perspective of acting is that the former justifies its purposes by the profit of as many as possible, the moral perspective of acting however is taken up only, if the purposes are adjusted to the prospect that *all* the people here and now and in future can live in prosperity, safety and inner contentment. So the neo-liberal position argues only pragmatically celebrating capitalism as the most successful economy without telling that it pushes two thirds of the world population into poverty. These are exactly those two thirds that could ensure their existence without problems before the colonization, means before the arrival of capitalism and its global and monopole system of the market, which unmask the free play of demand and offer as ideology from the beginning on.

Well, Kant's teleological construct of a moral history of mankind should not be read as if mankind would evolve automatically its potential of reason or as if the cosmopolis would be inscribed in human nature as fate, so it would need just a bit of patience to work off historic setbacks and to enter the empire of freedom. Not only that no individual will ever succeed to develop perfectly one's abilities and to reach perfectly one's destination, because perfectibility is first of all indefinite, which means that even successful biographies do not prove that all the abilities are developed. Secondly it cannot be made something very straight out of the crooked wood man is made of. That means man is not only reasonable by nature, not even if he tries to identify one's duty and to submit one's acting to the moral law, but also influenced by instincts. Their structure only opens a winding path to man's destination of being reasonable and does it only, if reason in the shape of a hidden plan is put from outside i.e. from the recognizing subject into nature, since nature itself is totally indifferent and aimless. It needs an "addressed master of nature" i.e. a perspective beyond the immediate (imminent) context of nature to understand nature as process, in which the history of mankind is imbedded as a part of the history of nature. If indefinite perfectibility is specific for human nature, so Rousseau and Kant, then the moral history of man is nothing else than a self-evolving process of his specific nature. This interpretation would have the advantage that reason did not have to be defined as a counterpoint to nature but as a judicial instance enforcing or executing the will of nature.

Kant knows very well that he is moving to the skin ice of metaphysics, even if he deduces it from logic and installs it as an instrument of criticism against the dogmatic point of view. That's why he justifies his teleological model of the history of mankind from the position of the so called "logic of sense", which corresponds with the conventional wisdom. Seen from this perspective it does not make much sense – so Kant against Mendelssohn – to understand history of mankind as a permanent process of stagnation, which similar to an conjunctural graphic shows ups and downs but no moral progress in general. This would imply that history would be a fake put on stage just to take the spectator out of real life making him believe the end of the drama would depend on its actors and not on its author. In reality, so Kant, history understood as just a farce would depend on a higher authority also known as providence, which would not lead man to morals and reason just to a kind of technical perfection of survival skills. Yet such a conclusion contradicts totally the conventional wisdom, which cannot understand why human beings are fitted out with special reflection skills, if survival, also in civilized societies, can be managed much easier and without any effort of reflection as for instance the perfectly working state of aunts does show.

So history must not be understood as a continuing up and down which reminds us more of the legend of Sisyphus who only rolls the stone up to the top of the mountain to watch it rolling down again. Understood this way history of mankind would be always the same and not differ from unconscious evolutionary processes. It could even be supposed that nature, if it had a purpose, would realize its telos i.e. the cooperation of all the powers of nature as a whole system much better without man, who made himself a representative of law just by virtue of his rational skills. This namely is the deep dialectic of the history of mankind as a history of reason: the involved natural destination of becoming reasonable can be identified as such only by man himself but not by unconscious nature. That's why nature seen objectively is not teleologically ordered, just seen from the perspective of the late born, who knows how to make use of nature on the strength of instrumental reason.

Unfortunately the utilization of nature by instrumental reason is hiding several risks. Certainly man succeeds to elevate from "raw nature" via discipline, cultivation and civilization. But this is not enough to place the history of mankind on a superior level of evolution. Reduced to technical and pragmatic knowledge man's rationality compared to the animal's one just appears a quantitative, not as a qualitative "more", so it needs more than only an evolutionary leap to turn the mechanic process of nature to a history of evolving reason. It needs

“moralization” to construct the evolution of mankind as a dynamic history of intellectual cultivation, whose destination in fact had to be deduced transcendently by the categorical imperative in the shape of the peaceful coexistence of all the human beings in this world.

Since the idea of the cosmopolis is not an empiric fact but a counterfactual construct, it is essentially connected with logic and not with romantic pathos, which an only superficial view at the plan of the “eternal peace” could indicate. The cosmopolis is the logical consequence of understanding the process of mankind as a progress of morals and reason, which does not develop by incident but by a plan of reason that is taking its elements from a functionally arranged nature. The functionally arranged nature definitely is a theoretical construct as well as the morally proceeding mankind, yes, without this inner telos of nature we could not even get the idea of mankind as a history of intellectual cultivation, yet it proves as such the fact of reason i.e. a perspective of reflection which observes nature from now on and submits it under the law of cause and effect.

Is it cogent to the conventional wisdom that considering the functional arrangement of nature the human outfit with special rationality is caused by the loss of reliable instincts, then it is also clear that this evolutionary compensation does not really lift up man from animal kingdom. Man gets up out of the state of nature, if he develops moral judgment beside technical rationality in the shape of survival skills, so he can get reasonable and free. This is the only way a human being can realize one’s destination, which is not only adjusted to a domesticated strategy of survival that explains civilization in its role to restrain the wild human nature as the highest level of human evolution. As if the “anti-civilized” could not burst out of civilization any time which war and genocide give proof of especially in the modern age – and not the first time at Auschwitz.

So the process of civilization must not mark time in the sense of a pure improvement of techniques of cohabitation. This would politically tend to an extension of guardianship of the power elites payable by the big crowd feeling comfortable with the idea that others think and decide for it. Both attitudes, to think for others and to let think maybe effective seen from the pragmatic perspective, since the social system is indifferent towards its reproductive mechanism, as long as it only works. That’s why pragmatists and apologists of the instrumental reason, who understand societal coexistence mechanically as a centralized or decentralized apparatus, whose parts have necessarily to work for to avoid their own elimination, do not have anything in common with a moral philosophical interpretation of society. Which higher level in the history of mankind could still be climbed up to, if instrumental reason actually provides all the measures to conjure up the human zoo out of the “order of jungle”, which probably does not totally defeat war and poverty but pushing them aside to the periphery of the system, so they do not interfere with the inner mechanism of the machine?

The human zoo is not a system, where Kant’s “protected comrades” would have their unshakable seat. They would be sorted out and replaced by better modules. Exactly this “gardener-principle” separating useful plants from weed by its wiping out and installing a nature of second grade is the basis of the ideology of the genocide. Getting practical this ideology does not automatically destabilize the social system or put an end to civilization. Genocide and civilization do not exclude each other according to instrumental reason but according to moral reason. That’s why something has to join, which tames the blind powers of rationality and would show them a way out of the coincidences of history. Judgment is needed first to submit the special under the general i.e. to abstract and to formalize and secondly to make out the logic of sense. Judgment urges to identify the common will as a higher perspective compared to the particular interest, a perspective that seen from its tendency can only be defined as a “world perspective”.

The “logic of sense” and the “logic of system” are not necessarily contradictory but also not supposed to be complementary either. Does it make sense to work on the project of a durable

world peace without proving it by empiric studies – the opponents of this project had to give the proof spoken with Kant – functionally seen it might also look rational to outsource long term projects in the land of Utopia and to strengthen the mechanism of the system and the structures of power. Does the logic of system presides over the “logic of sense”, only such acting would make sense, which creates profit or surplus value. This would mean that all acting just under the purpose to respect the other’s dignity would fall out of the sphere of rationality. Acting in solidarity in accordance with the categorical imperative, the epitome of rational ethics, suddenly appears irrational, even stupid patronized by instrumental reason. Which language would not have various sayings expressing that honesty does not sell?

Seen from the transcendental point of view it is exactly the other way round. Not the logic of system which plays a role in the field of the empiric sciences is highest measure of acting but the moral law, whose existence I cannot prove and do not even have to do so either. It can only be deduced out of the suitability of nature, which is a principle constructed by the logic of sense. The construct of the suitable arrangement of nature is a product of logic as well as mathematical abstractions. This is the way of interpreting metaphysics as a method to get to the bottom line of the “things” naming the conditions of their existence and the existence of all the possible things and relations and giving science – so Kant’s hope- a common direction describable as work on the project of the cosmopolis. This requires a common effort of reason among all the sciences getting up above their own dogmatism i.e. enlightening themselves about their interest of research, because only an enlightened point of view reaches the public, the only upholder of a possible constitutional state and a possible cosmopolis.

Concerning the establishment of the constitutional state in the horizon of international law an enlightened public is needed which is the world public not only since the proclamation of the “global age”. The existence of the constitutional state and the cosmopolis as well depends on the degree of enlightenment of the public and its ability to judge reasonably. A person, who makes judgments based on reason, does not accept answers that are only derived from instrumental reason. He studies the facts and the certain interest of research according to the unconditional obligation revealing itself as a world perspective or as a preview of the cosmopolis. This logical consequence seen from the subjective point of view of a teleologically constructed history of mankind may practically be ignored by individuals, single nations or even by specific epochs but never by the whole history of mankind. Since mankind cannot escape from its destination, which is a moral one, the cosmopolis based on international law and the accompanying idea of a principal world peace is not an empty pipe dream but the condition of the possible rule of law or as Cassirer says “the norm for any civil constitution at all”.

Regarding critical epistemology, emancipating ethics and a constitutional democracy on the principles of a secular natural law nobody can leave out Kant, not even his opponents. This does not mean that Kant’s transcendental construction of a moral history of mankind would be incontestable, it does not mean either that we have to share his confidence in reason and human judgment facing the temporary victory of the instrumental reason against the moral one. But paying tribute to Kant means setting the model of the constitutional state against functional and only pragmatic constructions of society, politics and ideologies. Strictly speaking the constitutional state cannot realize itself beyond the community of states but only in it and through out. What would we think about a nation regarding its constitutional level, which produces its prosperity and the included reliability of law by exploitation of other nations? So national prosperity and national democracy is not a safe indicator for the existing constitutional state, if economic and political progress at home stops or sets back the development at other places. That’s why the constitutional state cannot be realized partially but only in the community of all the states and nations, so everybody who votes for the constitutional state also delivers the prospect of the cosmopolis at the same time.

What is the meaning of Kant's final statement in his probably most famous essay: "What Is Enlightenment?", when he says that this epoch is not really enlightened but would be on its way? Actually it means that no era can define itself as enlightened or as the owner of a safe knowledge, because – and at this point Hegel was right – the position of a specific historic epoch in the hole of the history of spirit can be recognized only from behind, when it has been changed into a new epoch as well as the observer's view. Seen from this perspective enlightenment is a permanent process, because every generation is asked to reflect its own level of knowledge and consciousness and to develop a critical distance towards the "Here and Now", which would allow to compare the reality and perception. Seen from the idealistic point of view a future prospect would show up which appears not so much fictive but logically constructed. Assuming the biographic nature of mankind, which can only rise to reason and enlightenment as something imbedded in the system of functional nature, it is logically consequent holding out the prospect of a more evolved societal practice that would overcome war, oppression and structural poverty. To paraphrase the beginning of the enlightenment-essay these scourges of mankind could be eradicated long ago, because nature has given the gift of reason, i.e. the gift to not only identify problems but also to solve. Greed and laziness, qualities that are not given by nature but had to be learned in the process of civilization, are causing war, mismanagement, corruption and social injustice – phenomena which all together have to be added to the functional logic of the instrumental reason.

Two hundred years on Adorno stated that the principal problem of the civil society and its modernity is the slower speed of the moral progress compared to technological improvement including its short-sighted effectivity perspectives, then he is exactly repeating Kant's criticism of the dominance of pragmatic thinking. The only difference to Kant might be that Adorno is not convinced of the unity of reason anymore, which made it possible for Kant to transfer the logically ended up pragmatism into the sphere of moral reason. Kant's hope that political pragmatism if constitutionally anchored would lead to a step by step approach of political and moral acting is based on the fact of only *one* reason, so moral reason would come back in through the backdoor. Actually the statesman just wants to obtain and remain in power. To realize this goal he must promise if not guarantee social justice as well as interior and exterior peace. In fact his reelection will depend on how seriously he kept his promises. So moral reason invisibly pervades strictest pragmatism, pulls it to the path of humanitarian progress and apparently even against its own will. Against the fact of the unity of reason, instrumental reason, when it is only a part of the whole, is very powerless. The *whole* reason takes possession of the functional logic and unites pragmatic and moral acting again.

That is why the cosmopolis cannot be bypassed, if – and this is the *conditio sine qua non* – if the societies organize and legitimate themselves constitutionally. Such a constitution based on equal rights is certainly intentional, otherwise the functionally ordered nature had not endowed man with reason. So it only needs the evolvment of the powers of judgment, of enlightenment and of moral education to establish the constitutional state. Its efficiency regarding inner security and welfare allows the conclusion that the constitutional state in the shape of a republic will spread step by step and the approach to a cosmopolis passes progressively the history of nations.

However, this is not how things transpired. Instrumental reason instead of evolving its hidden ethical potential has swallowed moral reason, so only those thoughts appear reasonable that can be translated into terms of calculation. In fact the historic catastrophes of the 20th century such as: Verdun, Auschwitz, Stalingrad, Hiroshima and My Lai show the limits of a narrow not self-reflexive pragmatism also known as immoral cleverness in the terms of Kant. But it does not seem that the modernity has drawn a different conclusion than making the instrumental reason more and more perfect i.e. to carry on and on at a point, when the peak has already been crossed. Instead of trying to defeat the presence of civilized barbarism in the constitutional state, which we could have been done at any time over a long period, we

arrange ourselves with the system and develop strategies of survival in a society beyond any law. It does not need a “logic of sense”, a world perspective or the natural law in the sense of equal rights to survive the “order of jungle”. It just needs strategic thinking to look through hierarchies, to mark out territories and to place oneself close to the center of power. If there is anybody who has doubts or even objections against the fixed system of the “immoral cleverness”, he is branded as: undecided, less flexible and naïve or even subversive.

It was not individual failing, which led to the 20th century being the most bloodiest battlefield in the history of mankind, but it was the monopoly of technology, which permitted the cover up of moral failing in the guise of patriotism and obedience. Both are adaptation techniques of the jungle, which can barely be concealed by the high standard of technology found in the leading industrial nations. That is why barbarism resurfaces time and time again, as long as we are satisfied just get civilized, as Kant says in his lecture on education, respectively to improve civilization and certain adaptation techniques instead of moralizing ourselves in order to prove worthy of our destination.

Yes, human dignity stands in the center of the project of enlightenment. Rousseau, in his reply to the Academy of Dijon's question regarding the origin of inequality amongst human beings, told us that: economic and social constraints, rather than predestination, create social inequality. Beyond the natural distinctive marks such as: gender, age and physical strength all the human beings were equal in the natural state, because no property existed, whose varying distribution favors or even creates hierarchic structures. According to Rousseau, the first man who enclosed some land with a fence, claimed it as his own, and then found people stupid enough to believe it, was the real founding father of the civil society. Private property may be of great significance for the process of civilization, i.e. for the development of instrumental reason, which has been severely condemned by Rousseau in his discourse on sciences and arts, but not for establishing the real constitutional state. The constitutional state is certainly based on the right of property, but this right has to be distinguished essentially from a wild freewheeling concentration of material goods. To be precise the right of property does not mean that the strong one can take possession of as much as his strong arm might reach to. It means rather to coordinate the access to the goods, so physical distinction marks do not decide about the way of distribution but the individual need. So Rousseau concludes that the strong did not kill the weak in the natural state but shared with them as long as there was something left to be shared. In opposite to animals, which just follow blindly their instinct, the first human beings listened to the “natural compassion” that restrained the plain survival instinct. This natural compassion, in a way the innate moral feeling is the origin of reason and freedom, because we have to make choices concerning the many options, which the extended room for maneuvers offers from now on. On the other hand the natural compassion is a testament to human dignity, since it is contradictory to the pure pragmatism of self-preservation.

Man is not only free to decide on one purpose out of the mass of options, which promises a calculable advantage. He can also decide against short-sighted profit calculations and pursue an object, which does not have any accrue any advantage to him, but maybe derives a benefit, for his neighbor or for the next generation. And following the logic of Kant, a person has dignity regardless of their social position, intellectual maturity or other exterior distinction marks, and is capable of acting purely through a sense of duty, without thought to any accruable benefit.

Kant was an excellent Rousseau scholar. Kant was an excellent Rousseau scholar. Not only is it said that Kant read Rousseau's "Emile" in only one night and that Rousseau's portrait was the only picture on the wall of Kant's study, but that we may also find Rousseau quoted in the context of the justification, through natural law, of the constitutional state. But this natural law has nothing in common with traditional nature law anymore, which was anchored in God's will and did not only give every species its position in the whole system of nature, but also

every human being, whose social role and position was “natural grown” and in this sense also divinely-ordained.

The modern natural law, which Rousseau founded, was very different. His principle was of dignity that is deduced from natural freedom and natural compassion. This dignity reveals the legal claim, which can only be realized, if all human beings are equal before the law. Seen from this perspective the constitutional principle of equality is natural and reflects the functional order of nature at a higher moral level, so the judiciary rather embracing the natural law than opposes it. Then "arts" would revert to nature again like in morally educated persons, who do not only do their duty, because they must, but also because they like to do so, because it becomes second nature. This second nature does not extinguish the first original nature as the traditional theorists of the natural law have stated since Hobbes, but make it complete in the sense of its functional destiny. Seen from the perspective of the natural law, the constitutional state, realized in the cosmopolis, does not contradict the natural order. In the constitutional state only i.e. in the community of all states man can evolve his biographical nature in a moral and reasonable way. This not only makes sense in terms of natural human dignity but also with regard to pragmatic purposes. Why is moral feeling, perfectibilité and free will given to us, if not in order to recognize the functionality of their interplay and to deduce that this is a guiding thread for a reasonable history of mankind?

If it all depends on placing the process of civilization under the law, as Kant in his lecture on education already stated, which means not to leave its development to coincidences, arbitrariness or the technological knowledge but to a reasoned plan, then actually it just needs that determination, which overcomes laziness, cowardice and jealousy and faces bravely the risk society as the only real promise of the constitutional state. Without doubt the individual existence in the modern constitutional state involves numerous uncertainties. When in former times the affiliated status decided about what is legal, the positive law appears quite arbitrary from the modern point of view, it was nevertheless seen irrevocable, even if it ran in counter to the natural feeling of justice. In modern societies however the law has to be repeatedly established in the discourse, not because the principles of natural law such as dignity and equality had been annulled but because of the changing societal circumstances. These are exposed to certain variations, which can get uncontrollable the more the positive law withdraws from the natural law and leaves the development of the society to an amoral pragmatism, which sets its purposes, as it has recently occurred, to suit the current zeitgeist. The relapse into the natural state under exclusion the incalculable moral feeling would be pre-programmed by that.

To end up once again in barbarism, it had not been necessary to remove from the natural state so far and to work so hard under the conditions of an alienated existence. Not only that civilization would sink back to the wild nature state in accordance to an exclusively instrumental reason. Civilization, in distracting the balance of the natural functionality, would decline even more as it would disempower those instincts that serve the preservation of the species. One had really not to leave the natural state to throw back the historic world into unconscious nature. This would contradict the functional order of nature as well as the fact of reason.

Kant as a contemporary of Frederic the Great knew what he was talking about. The Silesian Wars, in terms of cruelty and modern weapon technology, outdid all previous wars in Europe to such an extent, that even the warlord Frederic could not help but complain about the slaughter, that he, through his own sense of duty as he was to say, had ordered. Historiography shows however that Prussia, an agricultural nation, would not catch up with the European superpowers without the annexation of Silesia, and for reasons of power and not of duty, Frederic went to war against Maria Theresia. That is, why we have to look closely and very carefully at the term of duty and to distinguish dutiful acting from acting out of duty. One only acts out of duty who follows the categorical imperative for its own sake, for the sake

of its reasonability, irrespective of the material success. It is not enough just to do one's duty to avoid punishment for example, which would be identical with blind obedience that does not look into the given orders. There is absolutely no duty involved in going to war, except in the case of where a nation must unavoidably defend itself from attack. So the warlord Frederic, as commander in chief, cannot hide behind duty, as someone who just follows orders and duty, and ignores that it would have been his very first duty, according to Kant, to "repulse", through negotiation, war and all its cruelty.

Against this backdrop, the guiding thread that leads to the establishment of the cosmopolis and the plan of a permanent peace, appears as the first duty of politics, under whose patronage the political discourse must take place. This discourse is necessarily public, because the common will, in looking at particular interests, cannot be hidden behind closed doors but must be seen as the united will of all citizens. Quoting Habermas, the common will, if it is not infected by the lust for power, is only represented by the public. The general access of all potential concerned citizens to that which is public is therefore a constitutional principle, not only in order to have natural equality before law, but first of all, in order to be a constantly self-reflecting common will, and the only justification for the legitimacy of the state.

It is not the case that the common will can be figured out by empiric studies such as by interviews or elections. Empiric studies definitely reflect trends and tendencies of the zeitgeist, and certainly the zeitgeist is a measure for the power of the common will, but zeitgeist and common will are not the same. The zeitgeist can be manipulated and mistaken, but the common will, indestructible like the fact of reason and the categorical imperative is never mistaken. The common will can be ignored, but this in no way debilitates its legitimizing validity at all. Even if the world would be ruled by devils or transformed to a human zoo, where only calculating logic would be in charge, the validity of the moral law and the connected common will are indestructible. We do not have to conduct empiric studies to know that making war and destroying the environment contradicts the common will, since we cannot be sure, one way or the other, that the majority of those interviewed would stand on the side of pacifism and for the protection of environment. Actually it only needs to work on the speculative question: if any reasonable creature could wish that humankind would suffocate in a self made hothouse or would destroy itself by a final hostile confrontation - something that every war tends to ultimately gravitate towards? Following Kant's line of reasoning, no man, who is in full possession of his mental faculties, could not wish that, which would indirectly prove that the first duty of the constitutional state is avoiding any war. Only in the horizon of this chief principal do the state and its representatives obey the common will, which has just to be identified therefore and not to be created. It was Kant's hope that this discourse might be established through education and enlightenment, since man can neither evade his biographical self-creation nor the fact of reason. This fact of reason does not only guarantee the indestructibility of the common will and the moral law but also guarantees individual autonomy and freedom.

After marching through Kant's philosophy of history, we must ask, to what extent can the transcendental model of the cosmopolis, held together only by the metaphysical construct of a functionally ordered nature, can be part of a modern discourse in view of the failing of modernity itself with respect to its own dialectic. Instead of using the antagonism between technical and moral reason productively in favor of the authority of the moral reason to issue directives, modernity left the whole field of science to instrumental pragmatism and handed the societal practice over to experts, who have as much to do with Kant's republic of scientists as plain power politics have to do with the discourse – nothing. But the question is, will the public discourse as the forum of the common will ever disempower the self-appointed circle of power experts thinking of realpolitik, which makes use of every instrument, if dishonorable or not, to force particular interests against the common will. Maybe the current meaning of the transcendental model of the cosmopolis is its critical potential that holds up the mirror to the

power elites, so we at least, if not they, can see the principal amorality of the instrumental reason.

So criticism is the core of Kant's metaphysics of history and the reason, why his metaphysics outlasted his epoch and made him to the very first global philosopher. Kant, that is to say, identified "world" not with a coincidental and necessarily limited perspective of the world but with the whole history of mankind as a morally evolving process. On this theoretical basis every human being is a citizen of the world by birth. This message contains Kant's lasting merit for the modernity – and is probably its only chance.